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AULT v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO.-
DEATH KNELL TO THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE AGAINST SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL
CONDUCT IN STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
On a November morning in 1964, Darrell Francis Ault was per-
manently disabled deep in a Mohave, California canyon. He had
been a passenger on an International Harvester Co. vehicle known
as a Scout. The owner and driver had traversed the same canyon
road on two prior occasions in the same vehicle without difficulty.
The road was sufficiently wide and dry, and the Scout was traveling
at only ten to fifteen miles an hour when it left the roadway.
Mr. Ault brought an action against International Harvester Co.,
the manufacturer of the Scout, alleging negligent and defective de-
sign and breach of warranty. He claimed that the die cast alumi-
num steering box on the vehicle had failed while it was on the road-
way, causing the Scout to go out of control and down into the can-
yon. The manufacturer countered by blaming the accident on the
driver's prior drinking, or some other unknown cause, and argued
that the gear box broke on impact as the vehicle fell down the
canyon.
At trial the plaintiff was permitted to show that three years after
the accident, International Harvester Co. changed from aluminum
to malleable iron in the production of Scout gear boxes. The de-
fendant strenuously objected and contended that such evidence vio-
lated California Evidence Code section 1151, barring the use of evi-
dence of subsequent remedial conduct "to prove negligence or cul-
pable conduct."'
A jury returned a verdict of $700,000 in plaintiff's favor. The
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reversed
and subsequently the California Supreme Court granted a hearing.
1. CAL. Evnm. CODE § 1151 (West 1968) provides:
When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary
measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended
to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent
measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct
in connection with the event.
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On October 31, 1973, the supreme court affirmed the court of appeal,
holding that evidence of the change to iron gear boxes was inadmis-
sible to establish that the gear box was defectively designed.2 The
evidence was said to be prejudicial to the defendant because it was
received as an admission of fault.3 However, this did not mark the
end of litigation. On December 5, 1973, a rehearing was granted,
and one year later the California Supreme Court reversed its posi-
tion and affirmed the original holding of admissibility by the trial
court.' Justice Mosk, who wrote a vigorous dissent in the first
supreme court opinion, wrote the majority opinion in the more re-
cent case. Justice Clark, who concurred in the first opinion, was
the lone dissenter after the rehearing. Justice Mosk's rationale of
admissibility will be closely examined. Such examination will be
prefaced by a review of the traditional exclusionary rule against
subsequent remedial conduct.
THE TRADITIONAL ExcLusIoNARY RULE
AD ITS EXCEPTIONS
The exclusionary rule against subsequent remedial conduct is
well established in California, both by statute5 and case law.6 The
2. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 10 Cal. 3d 337, - (opinion
omitted), 515 P.2d 313, 315, 110 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1973).
3. Id. at - (opinion omitted), 515 P.2d at 316, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
4. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
It is noted here that Ault is not the first California case to consider
evidence of subsequent remedial conduct in a strict products liability
setting. In Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970),
it was disclosed at trial that shortly after an accident involving a young
boy and a washing machine, the launderette owner himself installed micro-
switch safety devices on his machines. These devices prevented the ma-
chines from operating with the doors opened and would have prevented
the injury suffered by the youngster if previously installed. Id. at 323, 82
Cal. Rptr. at 422. Apparently, no objection was made and the issue of the
California exclusionary rule was never raised.
5. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1151 (West 1968); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.5 (b) (West
1966) (same rule in an action against a governmental agency).
6. Helling v. Schindler, 145 Cal. 303, 311-15, 78 P. 710, 713-15 (1904);
Sappenfield v. Main St. & A.P.R.R., 91 Cal. 48, 61-63, 27 P. 590, 593-94
(1891); City of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. App. 3d 778, 783, 109
Cal. Rptr. 365, 368 (1973); Wilson v. Gilbert, 25 Cal. App. 3d 607, 615, 102
Cal. Rptr. 31, 36 (1972); Hercules Powder Co. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp.
of America, 151 Cal. App. 2d 387, 398, 311 P.2d 907, 914 (1957); Church v.
Headrick & Brown, 101 Cal. App. 2d 396, 413, 225 P.2d 558, 568 (1950).
In other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Russell v. Page Aircraft Maintenance, Inc.,
rationale for exclusion in the original negligence setting is two-fold.
First, subsequent remedial conduct is logically irrelevant on the is-
sue of antecedent negligence. It is what occurs prior to the injury,
and not what happens afterwards, that determines whether there
has been a culpable breach of duty.7 Otherwise stated, the reason-
able person standard must be applied at the time prior to plaintiff's
injury without the benefit of hindsight subsequent to the injury.
It is also said that evidence of post-injury alterations lacks rele-
vance or probative value because changes effected after injury ad-
mit of varying explanations inconsistent with due care.8 A change
455 F.2d 188, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Alabama law); Hellig v.
Studebaker Corp., 347 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1965) (applying Oklahoma
law); Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1959) (applying
Montana law); Ferguson v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 307 F. Supp. 658, 664 (W.D.
Ark. 1969); Otis Elevator Co. v. McLaney, 406 P.2d 7, 15 (Alas. 1965);
Polster v. Griff's of America, Inc., 520 P.2d 745, 747 (Colo. 1974); City of
Niceville v. Hardy, 160 So. 2d 535, 539 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964); Stuckey's Car-
riage Inn v. Phillips, 122 Ga. App. 681, 686, 178 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1970); Seipp
v. Chicago Transit Auth., 12 Ill. App. 3d 852, 857, 299 N.E.2d 330, 334 (1973);
Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266, 277-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972);
Luse v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 350, 353, 112 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1961); Cox v.
City of Louisville, 439 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969); Hadrick v. Diaz,
302 So. 2d 345, 351 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Denolf v. Frank L. Jursik Co., 54
Mich. App. 584, 591-92, 221 N.W.2d 458, 462-63 (1974); Faber v. Roelofs, 298
Minn. 16, 20, 212 N.W.2d 856, 859 (1973); Catholic Diocese Nutchez Jackson
v. Jaquith, 224 So. 2d 216, 224 (Miss. 1969); Diversified Metals Corp. v.
Aaron Ferer & Sons, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Mo. 1973); O'Neal v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 109 N.H. 197, 198, 247 A.2d 183, 184 (1968); Carollo v. Rose,
43 App. Div. 2d 831, 350 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1974); Price v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 48, 161 S.E.2d 590, 602 (1968); Van Ornum v. Otter Tail
Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188, 199 (N.D. 1973); Parsons v. Leavitt, 249 Ore.
283, 285, 437 P.2d 843, 844 (1968); Pressler v. City of Pittsburgh, 419 PA.
440, 443-44, 214 A.2d 616, 618 (1965); Lapierre v. Greenwood, 85 R.I. 484,
491, 133 A.2d 126, 129 (1957); Maus v. Pickens Sentinel Co., 186 S.E.2d 809,
811 (S.C. 1972); Morin v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 209 N.W.2d 895, 897 (S.D.
1973); Belote v. Memphis Dev. Co., 51 Tenn. App. 423, -, 369 S.W.2d 97,
106 (1962); City of Amarillo v. Reid, 510 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974); Mabe v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 145 W. Va. 712, 718, 116
S.E.2d 874, 877-78 (1960).
7. Sappenfield v. Main Street & A.P.R.R., 91 Cal. 48, 62, 27 P. 590, 593
(1891); Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 508, 135 N.E.2d 231,
238 (1956); Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Clenm, 123 Ind. 15, 19, 23 N.E. 965,
966 (1890).
One commentator phrases the irrelevancy argument this way: "[T]he
law rejects the notion that 'because the world gets wiser as it gets older,
therefore it was foolish before.'" Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Sub-
sequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of Repair, 7 THE FORUM 1, 2 (1971)
(quoting Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R.N.S. 261, 263
(1869)).
8. 2 J. WIGmORE, EvminNcE 151 (3d ed. 1940); see also cases collected
in C. McComvncF, THE LAW OF EviDwcNE 666 (2d ed. 1972).
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might be made not as a safety or corrective measure, but rather
for functional, aesthetic or economic reasons. 9
Arguably, since it is a possible inference that a subsequent modi-
fication is made to correct an antecedent negligent condition, the
evidence of the modification should be admitted. It would then
remain for the opponent to argue the competing inferences.10
However, even conceding this theory of admissibility, a second ra-
tionale for the exclusionary rule has been applied to defeat admissi-
bility. This alternative basis for excluding evidence of subsequent
remedial conduct is the encouragement of repairs or safety mea-
sures after injury.1' A defendant might refrain from taking cor-
rective measures after an injury if he feared such measures would
be used against him in a subsequent suit as an implied admission
of fault or responsibility.
The exclusionary rule against subsequent remedial conduct loses
much of its vitality in light of the several recognized exceptions.
Courts have admitted evidence of subsequent repairs or corrective
measures to establish notice of a prior defect; 12 the cause of the
accident;' 3 condition at the time of the accident;' 4 control of the
premises in question;' 5 the duty of the defendant to repair;' 6
9. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 125, 528 P.2d 1148,
1155, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 819 (1974) (Clark, J., dissenting).
10. 2 WIGmORE, supra note 8, at 151.
11. McCopaMcK, supra note 8, at 666; B. WITN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE
343 (2d ed. 1966); 2 WIGmORE, supra note 8, at 151-52; see also CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1151, Comment (West 1968).
12. Patton v. Sanborn, 133 Iowa 650, 652-53, 110 N.W. 1032, 1033 (1907);
Harig v. McCutcheon, 23 Ohio App. 500, 503, 155 N.E. 701, 702 (1926); contra,
Laurenzi v. Vranizan, 25 Cal. 2d 806, 812-13, 155 P.2d 633, 637 (1945).
13. Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 Cal. 182, 188, 106 P. 587, 590 (1910).
But there are few recent cases applying such exception. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d
1296, 1314-15 (1959).
14. Bailey v. Kawasaki-Kisen, K.K., 455 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1972);
Steele, Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Wiedemann Mach. Co., 280 F.2d 380, 382
(3d Cir. 1960); Dyas v. Southern Pac. Co., 140 Cal. 296, 306-07, 73 P. 972,
975 (1903); Brauger v. Pioneer Roll Paper Co., 6 Cal. App. 691, 694-95, 92
P. 1043, 1044-45 (1907); Huxol v. Nickell, 205 Kan. 718, 723, 473 P.2d 90,
94 (1970); contra, Helling v. Schindler, 145 Cal. 303, 313, 78 P. 710, 714
(1904).
15. Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1973);
Trent v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., 334 F.2d 847, 861-62 nn.9 & 10 (3d Cir.
1964); Morehouse v. Taubman Co., 5 Cal. App. 3d 548, 555, 85 Cal. Rptr.
308, 313 (1970); Slipps v. Chicago Transit Auth., 12 M. App. 3d 852, 857,
299 N.E.2d 330, 334 (1973); Thompson v. Essex Wire Co., 27 Mich. App. 516,
the feasibility of avoiding the accident; 1' for purposes of rebuttal
and impeachment;' 8 and when repairs or changes are effected by
a third person.19 One commentator has noted that the rule is no
longer one of general exclusion, but rather a positive rule of admis-
sibility subject only to the exception where the evidence is used
as an admission of negligence. 20 Such a swallowing of the exclu-
sionary rule by its exceptions has not always been lauded in light
of the policy behind the rule.
2'
536-37, 183 N.W.2d 818, 829 (1970); Croff v. Kearns, 29 App. Div. 2d 703,
286 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121 (1968); Parsons v. Leavith, 249 Ore. 283, 286, 437 P.2d
843, 844 (1968).
16. Kovacs v. Sun Valley Co., 499 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th Cir. 1974) (apply-
ing Idaho law); Morehouse v. Taubman Co., 5 Cal. App. 3d 548, 555, 85
Cal. Rptr. 308, 313 (1970); Baldwin Contracting Co. v. Winston Steel Works,
Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d 565, 573, 46 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426 (1965); Wright v. Coe
& Anderson, Inc., 156 Conn. 145, 155, 239 A.2d 493, 498 (1968).
17. Baldwin Contracting Co. v. Winston Steel Works, Inc., 236 Cal. App.
2d 565, 573, 46 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426 (1965); Dallas v. Grantie City Steel Co.,
64 Ill. App. 2d 409, 423-24, 211 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1965); Faher v. Roelofs,
298 Minn. 16, 21, 212 N.W.2d 856, 859 (1973); Bartlett v. Hantover, 84 Wash.
2d 426, 428-29, 526 P.2d 1217, 1218 (1974).
18. American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir.
1969); Tyler v. Dowell, Inc. 274 F.2d 890, 899 (10th Cir. 1960); Daggett v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 48 Cal. 2d 655, 661, 313 P.2d 557, 561 (1957); but
cf., Sanchez v. Bagues & Sons Mortuaries, 271 Cal. App. 2d 188, 191-92, 76
Cal. Rptr. 372, 374 (1969) and Pierce v. J.C. Penney Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d
3, 8, 334 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1959) (both cases refused to allow evidence of
repairs to be used for impeachment of a witness who had not actually au-
thorized or performed the repairs).
19. Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir.
1969); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, -, 454 P.2d 205, 210
(1969). For other exceptions, see generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1959);
Annot., 170 A.L.R. 7 (1947).
20. Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972
DuKE L.J. 837, 845.
21. See 18 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 683 (1967):
[A] ny clever legal subterfuge which circumvents the prohibition
of section 1151 and undermines the purpose for which it was
adopted, would seem subject to critical judicial scrutiny.
See also Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory,
5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 411 (1952).
[I]f it is the policy of the law to encourage owners to take appro-
priate measures to avoid future injury on the premises, what justi-
fication can there be for the many exceptions to the rule of absolute
exclusion .... If the only prohibited inference is that the failure
to have taken the precaution before the accident was negligent, the
evidence of subsequent repairs may be admitted in the discretion
of the trial judge whenever it logically tends to prove any pro-
bandum in the case other than negligent omission. Again the trial
judge is bedeviled by both a rule of absolute exclusion and a rule
of discretionary exclusion to be applied in the process of a single
ruling.
It has also been suggested, however, that in light of the many exceptions
to the exclusionary rule and the consequential defeating of the underlying
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THE Ault HOLDING OF ADMISSIBILITY
Ault v. International Harvester Co. 22 represents a further as-
sault upon the exclusionary rule against subsequent remedial con-
duct. Justice Mosk's majority opinion engaged a dual rationale of
admissibility of the post-accident design change in the Scout ve-
hicle. First, Evidence Code section 1151 was held to be inapplicable
to a strict liability case, noting that proof of "negligence or culpable
conduct" on the part of the manufacturer is not necessary in such
an action.23 Second, the public policy reason for the rule, that
of encouraging post-injury repairs, was said to be inapplicable in
the products liability field, since it is in the economic self interest
of a manufacturer to improve and repair defective products.24
These rationales will be given separate consideration.
The Language and Legislative History of
Evidence Code Section 1151
The Language
In Ault, the supreme court came to the conclusion that the lan-
guage and legislative history of Evidence Code section 1151 demon-
strate that the section is inapplicable to strict products liability.
As stated by Justice Mosk in his majority opinion, the plaintiff
pleading strict products liability need not allege or prove "negli-
gence or culpable conduct" on the part of the defendant manufac-
turer.2 , He added that if the legislature had intended to include
strict liability within the ambit of the statute, it would have used
an expression less related to and consistent with affirmative fault
than "culpable conduct"-i.e., a term embracing a moral rather than
a legal duty.26 In a footnote, Justice Mosk interpreted "culpable
policy of encouraging repairs, the rule ought to be abolished altogether.
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 4, 6-7. The latter commentator stresses further
that there has been no empirical data showing that the rule has resulted
in a single repair or that its abrogation would discourage repair. Id. at
6.
22. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
23. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
24. Id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
25. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
26. Id., 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
conduct" to refer to types of faulty conduct other than negligence,
such as wanton and reckless misconduct.27  Yet a retort might be
made that had the legislature intended to encompass wanton and
reckless misconduct, it would have used that very term in the
statute.
Although rejected by the Ault majority, the competing position
of the defendant in interpreting "culpable conduct" is not without
merit. "Culpable conduct" is arguably sufficiently broad to encom-
pass strict liability.28 It has been declared that imposing strict
liability amounts to characterizing the product itself rather than
the defendant's conduct.29 However, a leading scholar has argued
27. Id. at 118 n.3, 528 P.2d at 1151 n.3, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815 n.3.
28. See Resolution 10-6 Evidence; Subsequent Remedial Conduct, pro-
posed by the Los Angeles County Bar Association at the 1973 Conference
of Delegates, (unpublished resolution available through the State Bar of
California, 601 McAllister St., San Francisco, California 94102):
Resolved that the Conference of Delegates recommends to the
Board of Governors of the State Bar of California that the State
Bar sponsor legislation to amend Section 1151 of the Evidence Code
to read as follows:
1 Section 1151. Subsequent remedial conduct. When, after the
2 occurrence of an event remedial or precautionary measures
3 are taken, which, if taien previously, would have tended to
4 make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such sub-
5 sequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence (strict
6 liability, breach of warranty) or (other) culpable conduct
7 in connection with the event.
(Proposed new language underlined)
Statement of Reasons: . . .Arguably, the term "culpable conduct"
used in the present statutory language might be sufficient to cover
strict liability and breach of warranty, but it is arguable also that"strict liability" is that liability which is imposed irrespective of
culpability, as for example in a situation where even though the
higest and best standards of engineering and manufacturing have
been met, nevertheless, a defective product is produced (emphasis
added).
Although the Resolutions Committee recommended approval as amended,
the resolution was disapproved by the Conference. 48 CAL. STATE B.J. 722
(1973). It was therefore not referred to the Board of Governors or any
State Bar Committees for study (William B. Eades, Committee Coordinator
of the State Bar of California, letter to W. Merritt, July 3, 1975). Unfor-
tunately it could not be ascertained why the Conference disapproved the
resolution. It is possible either that the delegates believed the subsequent
remedial conduct statute should not extend to strict liability and breach of
warranty, or that it should but that the current statute suffices to convey
such meaning.
In addition, the Ault defendant finds support in Justice Clark's interpreta-
tion of "culpable conduct." 13 Cal. 3d at 124, 528 P.2d at 1155, 117 Cal.
Rptr. at 819 (Clark, J., dissenting).
29. Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Products Liability, 16 FOOD DRUG Cos-
mETC L.J. 585, 593 (1961).
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persuasively that it is easy to phrase the issue in terms of conduct.
30
Under this analysis, the manufacturer who places a defective
product on the market would be guilty of "culpable conduct" within
the meaning of Evidence Code section 1151. Indeed, that has been
the express holding of a recent New Jersey decision, applying a
statute identical to that in California. In Price v. Buckingham
Manufacturing Co.,8 1 plaintiff brought an action in strict liability
alleging a defect in a safety belt. The trial court disallowed evi-
dence as to modification of the belt-snap after the accident, citing
rule 51 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence. 2 On appeal, the
Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed without extended dis-
cussion. The reviewing court held that such subsequent remedial
measures are inadmissible whether the cause of action is in strict
liability or negligence.83
30. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965):
[A]ssuming that the defendant had knowledge of the condition of
the product, would he then have been acting unreasonably in plac-
ing it on the market? This, it would seem, is another way of pos-
ing the question of whether the product is reasonably safe or not
[i.e., "defective"]. And it may well be the most useful way of
presenting it.
John W. Wade is a Distinguished Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Uni-
versity; B.A. 1932, J:D. 1934, University of Mississippi; L.L.M. 1935, S.J.D.
1942, Harvard University. Reporter, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
(1965). Co-author, W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
(5th ed. 1971).
31. 110 N.J. Super. 462, 266 A.2d 140 (1970).
32. Rule 51. Subsequent Remedial Conduct:
When after the occurrence of an event remedial or precautionary
measures are taken, which, if taken previously would have tended
to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct
in connection with the event.
33. 110 N.J. Super. at , 266 A.2d at 141.
The applicable Kansas statute (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-451) is also identi-
cal to California Evidence Code section 1151. Prior to the enactment of
this statute in 1963, Kansas courts for many years admitted evidence of sub-
sequent remedial conduct when this tended to prove that the defendant was
negligent. The policy was apparently that the danger of discouraging re-
pairs was "not deemed of equal importance with protection against life and
limb" that could be achieved by admitting the evidence. Schwartz, supra
note 3, at 6-7 n. 31 (quoting syllabus of Howard v. Osage City, 89 Kan. 205,
132 P. 187 (1913)). See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1296, 1305 (1959)
and Annot., 170 A.L.R. 7, 28-31 (1947) for Kansas cases admitting evidence
of subsequent remedial conduct. Since the adoption of the exclusionary
rule, no Kansas decision has yet resolved the issue of evidencing subsequent
remedial changes in products liability cases.
The Ault majority ignored this precedent despite the identity of
the California and New Jersey statutory schemes. Instead, Justice
Mosk found support for abolishing the exclusionary rule in a recent
Illinois appellate decision, Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp. 4
The California Supreme Court interprets the holding of Sutkowski
to be that the Illinois statutory rule excluding evidence of post-
occurrence changes in negligence cases did not apply to prod-
ucts liability cases.35 This is an incorrect interpretation because
Illinois has no statute excluding evidence of post-occurence
changes.3 6 The Sutkowski court did not face the problem of statu-
See also FED. R. EviD. 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previ-
ously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence
of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence
ur culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeach-
ment (emphasis added).
Federal courts face the same construction problem as the California Su-
preme Court in Ault. Does the "culpable conduct" language incorporate
strict liability under the statute? One commentator has predicted that rule
407 will sanction admission of evidence of subsequent repairs when offered
to prove a product defect. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 5 n.22. Thus far that
prediction seems accurate. See Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744
(7th Cir. 1974) (post-occurrence changes deemed relevant in determining
whether a product is defective and no valid policy for exclusion); Hoppe
v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1973) (post-accident
modification deemed relevant to prove defective design). Other recent fed-
eral cases admit evidence of subsequent remedial conduct in products liabil-
ity cases under traditional exceptions to the exclusionary rule. See Ma-
honey v. Roper-Wright Mfg. Co., 490 F.2d 229, 232 (7th Cir. 1973) (apply-
ing Illinois law that post-accident design changes are admissible to show
feasibility of alternative design at the time of manufacture); Bowman v.
General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (post-accident pre-
cautions are admissible to rebut claim of impossibility of improvement or
to show feasibility of precautions at the time of manufacture).
Nevada has recently adopted the text of Federal Rule 407 into its statutes,
N.v. R-v. STAT. § 48.095 (1971). Prior thereto the Nevada Supreme Court
had opined that subsequent repairs would be admissible under a theory of
strict liability in tort as relevant to causation and defective and dangerous
condition. Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 415, 470 P.2d 135, 140
(1970). It remains to be seen if the "culpable conduct" language of the
new statute will affect the Ginnis dicta.
34. 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
35. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 121, 528 P.2d at 1151,
117 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
36. In Illinois the exclusionary rule against subsequent remedial conduct
is a product of case law. See, e.g., Hodges v. Percival, 132 Ill. 53, __, 23
N.E. 423, 424-25 (1890); Mitchell v. Four States Mach. Co., 74 Ill. App. 2d
59, __ 220 N.E.2d 109, 119 (1966); Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App.
2d 494, __ 135 N.E.2d 231, 238 (1956); Garshon v. Aaron, 330 Ill. App. 540,
-, 71 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1947).
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tory construction with which the Ault court had to cope. Further-
more, no Illinois court has yet ruled on the full implications of prov-
ing post-injury alterations in strict products liability cases.
87 Sut-
kowski narrowly held that evidence of post-occurrence changes may
be admitted to demonstrate the feasibility of alternative designs in
strict liability cases.38 This limited theory of admissibility, already
recognized in negligence cases,39 and a few strict products liability
cases,40 is not the equivalent of a holding that subsequent remedial
conduct is per se admissible in strict products liability cases. Yet
this is the interpretation of Sutkowski by the Ault majority. Thus
the California Supreme Court erroneously interpreted a case not
involving statutory construction in reaching its conclusion that the
California subsequent remedial conduct statute does not extend to
strict products liability.
The Legislative History
Just as the language of Evidence Code section 1151 does not
readily exclude strict liability, so too does the legislative history
not clearly remove it from the ambit of the statute. The California
37. Hafele, Evidence in Products Liability Cases: Proof of Post-Injury
Alterations-A Proposal, 60 ILL. B.J. 936 (1972).
38. 5 Ill. App. 3d at , 281 N.E.2d at 753:
In the development of products liability principles design alterna-
tives are appropriately considered whether reasonable care is the
basis of liability or where liability is predicated upon strict tort
liability. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629, 467 P.2d 229. .. . The possible existence of alternate designs
introduces the feature of feasibility since a manufacturer's product
can hardly be faulted if safer alternatives are not feasible.... If
the feasibility of alternative designs may be shown by the opinions
of experts or by the existence of safety devices on other products
or in the design thereof we conclude that evidence of a post occur-
rence change is equally relevant and material in determining that
a design alternative is feasible (emphasis added).
But see Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636 (ll. Ct. App. 1969). In
that case, the trial court permitted evidence of a change in the type of can
used by defendants to contain their product following an accident where
an exploding can blinded plaintiff. Surprisingly, the reviewing court
simply stated the evidence went to the issues of defect and negligence, and
its admission constituted no error. Id. at 646-47. There was no extended
discussion.
39. See, e.g., cases cited note 17 supra.
40. See, e.g., Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974);
Mahoney v. Roper-Wright Mfg. Co., 490 F.2d 229, 232 (7th Cir. 1973); Bow-
man v. General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Supreme Court concluded that the legislative history of section 1151
demonstrated the inapplicability of the statute to a strict liability
setting.41 The majority cited only the Law Revision Commission
comment to the statute in justifying its conclusion.4 2 Closer at-
tention to this comment 43 combined with a review of the Commis-
sion's two volume report on the Evidence Code44 and the Cali-
fornia Assembly hearings on the Evidence Code4 5 disclose that
strict liability was never expressly addressed in relation to the sub-
sequent remedial conduct statute. Silence on this issue indicates
that strict products liability was not necessarily intended to be ex-
cluded from Evidence Code section 1151.46 Indeed the issue may
simply have been overlooked.
According to the Commission comment, section 1151 was in-
tended to codify "well-settled law," citing Helling v. Schindler4 7
and Sappenfield v. Main Street & Agricultural Park Railroad
Co.48 At the outset it must be noted that these cases were decided
long before the genesis of a strict products liability doctrine in Cali-
fornia.49 At that time a plaintiff bringing an action for injury
41. 13 Cal. 3d at 117, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
42. Id. at 118-19, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
43. In proposing the Evidence Code, the California Law Revision Com-
mission provided a comment for each section. The state legislature either
approved the comments as drafted by the Commission or set out new or
revised comments drafted by the Assembly and Senate Committees. See
JouRNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY, April 6, 1965, and JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, April
21, 1965. Therefore, for each section of the Evidence Code, there is a com-
ment which is either a legislative committee comment set out in one of the
two journals, or a Law Revision Commission comment, that was approved
by the legislative committees, but not set out in their reports. Evidence
Code section 1151 contains a Commission comment.
44. 7 CmaoRNIA LAw REVsIoI CoMMssIoN, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS
AND STuD S 217 (1965); 6 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORTS,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 620 (1964).
45. California Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Transcript of Proceed-
ings on the Proposed Code of Evidence, State Capitol, Sacramento, Decem-
ber 16 & 17, 1964.
46. It is noted here that there is a cardinal rule of statutory construction
to effect the intent of the legislature. Tyrone v. Kelley, 9 Cal. 3d 1, 10-
11, 507 P.2d 65, 71, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767 (1973); Friends of Mammoth v.
Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 256, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056-57, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 761, 768-69 (1972); Mannheim v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 678, 686, 478
P.2d 17, 21, 91 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1970); see also CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE
§ 1859 (West 1955).
47. 145 Cal. 303, 78 P. 710 (1904).
48. 91 Cal. 48, 27 P. 590 (1891).
49. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Greenman was the first case expressly to espouse
strict liability in tort. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973).
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caused by a product was limited to a warranty or negligence theory.
Therefore, the exclusionary rule against subsequent remedial con-
duct originally addressed only the issue of negligence.15 At the
time of drafting the Evidence Code, the Commission had no au-
thority available which involved evidencing subsequent corrective
measures in a strict liability setting.51 It is presumptuous to as-
sume that because the Commission comment does not mention strict
liability that it was intended to be excluded from Evidence Code
section 1151.
The Law Revision Commission study on the Evidence Code also
contains nothing truly dispositive on the issue of the applicability
50. See, e.g., Helling v. Schindler, 145 Cal. 303, 312, 78 P. 710, 713-14
(1904):
[I]t is now well settled in this state, in accord with the rule pre-
vailing generally elsewhere, that evidence of precautions taken and
repairs made after the happening of the accident is not admissible
to show a negligent condition at the time of the accident (court's
emphasis).
Sappenfield v. Main St. & A.P.R.R., 91 Cal. 48, 61, 27 P. 590, 593 (1891):
There are some authorities ... which hold that evidence of this
kind [subsequent repairs] is admissible as being an admission by
the defendant of his negligence in not having previously provided
appliances of a suitable character; but the weight of authority is
against its admissibility... (emphasis added).
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151, Comment (West 1968):
The admission of evidence of subsequent repairs to prove negli-
gence would substantially discourage persons from making repairs
after the occurrence of an accident (emphasis added).
P. WESTBROOK, JR., ANALYSIS OP THE CALIFOIA EvIEcE CODF; CALI-
FORNiA EVIDENcE CODE MANuAL, 359 (C.E.B. 1966):
The chapter [chapter IX of the Evidence Code] codifies well-
settled law excluding the following types of evidence: (1) subse-
quent remedial conduct to prove negligence (§ 1151); . . . These
provisions of the code do not change preexisting law... (emphasis
added).
51. There is language in Helling v. Schindler, 145 Cal. 303, 313-14, 78 P.
710, 714 (1904), one of the early cases cited in the comment to section 1151,
which is fully applicable to a modern strict liability case:
To hold that an act of repairing affords evidence tending to show
that a previous injury was the result of a defect in the appliance
would deter a prudent person from making repairs (quoting Louis-
ville R.,R. Co. v. Malone, 109 Ala. 509, 518, 20 So. 33, 37 (1896)).
See also Church v. Headrick & Brown, 101 Cal. App. 2d 396, 413, 225 P.2d
558, 568 (1950):
[E]vidence [of subsequent changes] is inadmissible to show that
defective appliances were repaired after the accident [quoting 10
CAL. Jun. Precautions Subsequent to Accident § 115 (1923) ].
219'
of section 1151 to strict products liability. The Commission was
originally assigned to determine whether the law of evidence in
California should be revised to conform to the Uniform Rules of
Evidence.52 The Uniform Rules were not adopted in their en-
tirety, as the Law Revision Commission made certain modifications.
However, Uniform Rule 51, relating to subsequent remedial con-
duct, was recommended for approval without statutory adjust-
ment.58 Hence Uniform Rule 51 became California Evidence Code
section 1151. Several law review symposia have addressed the Uni-
form Rules,54 including separate discussion of rule 51." How-
ever, all of these reviews preceded the adoption of strict products
liability in 1963.56 Hence no commentator has directly disavowed
the application of Uniform Rule 51 to strict products liability.
Finally, the California Assembly hearings on the Evidence Code
can be examined. Unfortunately there is again no specific discus-
sion of Evidence Code section 1151 and strict liability.57 However,
comments made by witnesses at the hearings on the Evidence Code
in general are relevant. One witness called attention to the Evi-
dence Code comments in reflecting the legislative intent of the var-
ious provisions. However, another witness professed that the
legislative intent should be derived from a "common sense reading
of the statute."5" It has been discussed previously how the "culp-
able conduct" language of section 1151 is arguably sufficiently broad
to extend to strict products liability.5" It is also arguable that a
52. 6 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIsIoN ComIssIoN, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS
Aum STUD-s 607 (1964). The Uniform Rules of Evidence were drafted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
approved by it at its 1953 annual conference.
53. 6 CALIFoRNIA LAW REVISION CoMIIssIoN, REPORTS, RECOMMENDA-
TiONS AND STuDns, 620, 670 (1964).
54. Id. at 627 n.1.
55. See, e.g., Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10
RuT-GEs L. REV. 574, 590-92 (1956).
56. See note 49 supra.
57. In the 163 pages of the Transcript of Proceedings on the Proposed
Code of Evidence, supra note 45, the subsequent remedial conduct statute
is mentioned only once in a statement by John H. DeMoully, Executive
Secretary of the Law Revision Commission:
Division 9 codifies several exclusionary rules that are recognized
in existing statutory or decisional law. These rules are based on
considerations of public policy without regard to the reliability of
the evidence involved. The division states, for example, the rules
excluding evidence of liability insurance and evidence of subse-
quent repairs. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
58. Mr. DeMoully called attention to the Evidence Code comments. Id.
at 17. Senator Grunsky advocated a "common sense reading of the statute."
Id. at 23.
59. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
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"common sense" interpretation of "culpable conduct" should reach
the manufacturer who puts a defective product on the market cap-
able of causing injury. Given this "common sense" interpretation of
"culpable conduct," a conflict is created between the statute itself
and the Commission comment.60 During the legislative hearings,
it was resolved that conflicts between statutory language and com-
ments to the code provisions would be resolved in favor of the
statutory language.6 1 If the proposed "common sense" interpreta-
tion of the "culpable conduct" language is to prevail, Evidence Code
section 1151 should find applicability to strict products liability
cases.
The inevitable conclusion of this overview of the language and
legislative history of section 1151 is that there has been no clear
expression of legislative intent on the applicability of the statute
to strict products liability. The California Supreme Court should
either have deferred the issue to the legislature, 62 or given greater
credence to the public policy behind the exclusionary rule in its
interpretation of the statute.6 3 Public policy considerations behind
extending the exclusionary rule to strict products liability will now
be explored.
60. Recall that the comment to section 1151 addresses itself only to negli-
gence and says nothing about strict liability. See note 50 supra.
61. Transcript of Proceedings on the Proposed Code of Evidence, supra
note 45, at 20:
Assemblyman Z'Berg: "If there is a conflict between the language
in the statute, as would be understood by a clear logical judicial
mind, a conflict between that and the comment, is it your statement
and opinion that the courts would then follow their interpretation
of the language in the statute and disregard the comments and the
legislative intent as expressed in the Journals of the Assembly and
the Senate?"
Mr. DeMoully: "If it was an absolute conflict, I don't see how they
could do anything else really."
62. See 7 CA oRNIA LAW RWIsroN Co MMssIoN, REPORTs, RECOmnVIENDA-
TIONS AND STUDIES 31 (1965):
[T]here is a limit on the extent to which the courts can remedy
the deficiencies in a statutory scheme. Reform of the California
law of evidence can be achieved only by legislation thoroughly
overhauling and recodifying the law.
63. See Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259,
502 P.2d 1049, 1057, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1972):
Once a particular legislative intent has been ascertained, it must
be given effect "even though it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute." Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 (1944)
24 Cal. 2d 796, 802, 151 P.2d 505, 508 quoting 23 CAL. JuR., Legis-
Public Policy Behind Evidence Code Section 1151
Justice Mosk's Analysis
In Ault, the majority concluded that the public policy reason for
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial conduct, that of encour-
aging post-injury repairs, was inapplicable in strict products lia-
bility.64 Using a two-pronged argument, Justice Mosk first con-
tended that it was in the economic self-interest of a manufacturer
to improve and repair defective products. Hence a mass-producer
would not be deterred from taking corrective measures by the pos-
sibility that he might be manufacturing adverse evidence for a sub-
sequent suit.65 An answer to this rationale is that it is also in
the economic self-interest of any negligent tort-feasor to remedy
any dangerous conditions for which he is responsible, so he can pre-
vent recurring injuries and a multitude of suits. However, this ra-
tionale of an independent motive to repair has never justified the
abolition of the exclusionary rule against subsequent remedial con-
duct in negligence cases. It is disputatious whether it is a sufficient
justification for abrogating the rule in strict liability cases only be-
cause the economic stakes are higher for the mass-producer, who
faces possible loss of patronage as well as multiple suits.
The second proposed argument for not including strict products
liability within the ambit of section 1151 is that such a holding
would be contrary to the public policy of encouraging the mass-
producer to market safer products.66 That is, "excluding evidence
of subsequent repairs to encourage future remedial action may pre-
clude recovery under theories of products liability which are them-
lative Intent as Primary Consideration, § 107 (1925). As we stated
nearly a half century ago in In re Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605, 613,
234 P. 883, 886: "The mere literal construction of a section in a stat-
ute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legis-
lature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently
flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to
effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and
the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit
of the act."
See also CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1859 (West 1955).
64. 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
65. Id.
66. 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816. The purpose
of strict products liability has also been stated to be the shifting of the cost
of injuries resulting from defective products from defenseless consumers to
the manufacturers who put such products on the market. Price v. Shell
Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 725, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181 (1970);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
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selves designed to ensure safety in marketed products.
'6 7 An an-
swer to this rationale is that the public policy behind strict liability,
that of encouraging safer products, is best served by retaining the
traditional exclusionary rule against subsequent repairs. The mass-
producer of goods may be equally deterred from taking corrective
measures to cure alleged product defects as any negligent tort-
feasor if such action could be used as an implied admission of lia-
bility.68 This threat of a manufacturer's reluctance to cure alleged
product defects would be most pronounced where the manufacturer
hotly contests that his product is defective, or that any alleged de-
fect proximately caused a plaintiff's injury. When the key issues
are being disputed, the manufacturer is not readily disposed to in
any way alter his product. Permitting evidence of any changes he
might make as proposed corrective measures and an implied admis-
67. 13 Cal. 3d at 121 n.4, 528 P.2d at 1152 n.4, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816 n.4,
quoting Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, note
20 supra, at 849-50.
68. See Landry v. Adam, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. Ct. App. 1973). In advocat-
ing the application of the exclusionary rule in a strict products liability case,
the Louisiana court stated:
Another reason for the exclusion of such evidence (subsequent re-
medial conduct) is a policy consideration that a person would be
discouraged from repairing a defective condition after an accident
if evidence of that repair could be construed against him as an indi-
cation of liability. Id. at 595.
See also the language quoted from cases cited note 51 supra, and Resolu-
tion 10-6 Evidence: Subsequent Remedial Conduct, supra note 28:
Statement of Reasons: One of the policies reflected in the rule ex-
cluding evidence of subsequent remedial conduct is that of encour-
aging tort feasors to make changes or repairs after the accident to
reduce future hazards. The policy would seem to be equally valid
as applied to manufacturers, since they too should be encouraged
to affect those design and manufacturing changes which would
prevent the reoccurrence of an accident caused by a defective
product (emphasis added).
In addition to the anti-deterrent function of the exclusionary rule against
subsequent remedial conduct, the rule finds justification in a sense of fair-
ness. It would be unfair to penalize the manufacturer who improves his
product by permitting evidence of improvements to be considered as admis-
sions of antecedent liability. As a poignant example, consider the auito
manufacturers who are required by federal law to send "recall letters"
notifying purchasers of safety related defects. 15 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1970).
Manufacturers who refrain from giving such notice to purchasers are in vi-
olation of federal law. In a jurisdiction following Ault, manufacturers who
comply with the statute and give the required notice face having their re-
medial conduct construed against them as an admission in a subsequent sui
Such a "damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't" dilemma represents addi-
tional support for retaining the exclusionary rule in products liability.
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sion of liability would dispel any chance that the manufacturer
would give the plaintiff and all consumers the benefit of the doubt
and alter the product in question. If subsequent alterations are
excluded, however, this may be the impetus to induce the manufac-
turer to cure even a disputed defect.
Additional Reasons Justifying the Extension of the
Exclusionary Rule to Strict Products Liability
The cogency of the Ault rationale behind admitting evidence of
subsequent repairs or design changes in strict products liability
cases is not to be slighted. Indeed the several commentators who
have directly addressed this issue have all espoused a theory of ad-
missibility.69 However, there are two additional considerations
which warrant the application of the exclusionary rule to strict
products liability.
The first of these considerations is that expounded by Justice
Clark in his dissenting opinion in Ault, which may be labeled a
"legal relevancy" argument. Justice Clark contends that it is not
the encouragement of post-injury changes which is the basis of the
exclusionary rule, but rather the misuse of such evidence by ju-
ries.70 In negligence cases, juries are apt to unjustifiably view
post-injury changes as admissions of fault.71 They may well lose
sight of the fact that there are several competing inferences which
can reasonably be made from post-injury modifications, detracting
from the probative value of the evidence.72
In the products liability area, competing inferences from post-
injury modifications are equally pronounced. A change may not
reflect an admission of an antecedent defect, but may be motivated
by a desire to decrease production cost or to increase efficiency or
69. Davis, Evidence of Post-Accident Failures, Modifications, and Design
Changes in Products Liability Litigation, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 792 (1975);
Hafele, supra note 37; Schwartz, supra note 7; Note, Products Liability and
Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra note 20; Address by David M.
Harney under the title, Proof of a Product Defect by Evidence of Subse-
quent Design Changes, (unpublished copy on file at Harney, Bambic &
Moore, 650 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif6rnia 90017).
70. 13 Cal. 3d at 126, 528 P.2d at 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
71. Id. at 125, 528 P.2d at 1155, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
72. These competing inferences include a party's belief that the change
was the humane thing to do, that the change was the required standard
of conduct only after the injury is known, or the party's desire to rise above
the required standard. Finally, the change may be made not as a safety
measure at all, but for functional, aesthetic, or economic reasons. Id.
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salability.7 Although it can be argued as within the province of
competing counsels to argue the competing inferences, 74 there re-
mains the very real possibility that a jury will improperly view
evidence of subsequent remedial measures as an admission of fault
in products liability cases.75 The danger of such misuse of the evi-
dence is grounds for exclusion as legally irrelevant.76
The problem of misuse of subsequent repair evidence by a jury
becomes more pronounced in light of alternative pleading.77 Cur-
rently, a plaintiff has available three theories under which a manu-
facturer and seller of defective products can be reached-breach
of warranty, negligence, and strict liability. 78 It is the latter two
which were addressed in Ault. The majority distinguished between
negligence and strict liability sought to be imposed against a manu-
facturer. Justice Mosk noted that the plaintiff may recover in
strict liability if he establishes that the product was defective, and
he need not show that the defendant breached a duty of due
care.79 However, the difference between these alternative theories
of recovery should not be overstated and, more importantly, may
not be apparent to the jury. Professor Wade80 has stated that:
"[A] court which appears to be taking the radical step from negli-
gence to strict liability for products is really doing nothing more
than adopting a rule that selling a dangerously unsafe chattel is
negligence within itself."81  Indeed Professor Wade applies the
73. Id. at 126, 528 P.2d at 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
74. 2 WiGmoRE, supra note 8, at 151.
75. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 126, 528 P.2d at 1156,
117 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark is comfortable
using the term "fault" in relation to strict liability. Id. at 124, 126, 528 P.2d
at 1155, 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 819, 820. If this term is inappropriate for
strict liability, the impermissible purpose of evidence of subsequent repair
may alternatively be phrased broadly as an admission of "responsibility"
or "liability." See, e.g., Columbia & Puget Sound R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144
U.S. 202, 207 (1892) and Landry v. Adam, 282 So. 2d 590, 595 (La. Ct. App.
1973).
76. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 352 (West 1968) and FED. R. Evu. 43.
77. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 427.10 (West 1973) permits joinder of causes
of action and theories of recovery.
78. Note, Products Liability: Methods of Pleading and Proof for the
Plaintiff, 49 N. DAKOTA L. REv. 105 (1972).
79. 13 Cal. 3d at 118 & n.2, 528 P.2d at 1150 & n.2, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814
& n.2.
80. See note 30 supra.
81. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, supra note 30, at 14.
standard elements for determining negligence in discerning
whether a product is defective for strict liability purposes, i.e.,
balancing the utility and magnitude of the risk.
82
As the two theories of recovery blend together, difficulty arises
for the trier of fact as to matters of evidence and proof"8 and also
instructions to the jury.84 The Ault decision may well compound
such problems because while making admissible evidence of subse-
quent remedial conduct on the issue of strict liability, the court
purports to retain the exclusionary rule as to negligence. A jury
which is instructed that it may consider subsequent repairs or de-
sign changes in determining antecedent defectiveness or causation,
but not antecedent negligent design or manufacture, is apt to be-
come quite confused. Indeed the jury may apply evidence of sub-
sequent remedial conduct in finding an admission of prior negli-
gence,8 5 in spite of the limiting instruction.80 Where there arises
See also W. PROSsER, LAw oF TORTS 641, 644-45 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965):
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which
makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is
subject to liability to others whom he should expect to use the
chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption
of a safe plan or design (emphasis added).
But see id. § 402A(2) (a), where strict liability is imposed "although
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product.. . ." For further examples of narrowing the gap between negli-
gence and strict liability in products liability cases, see Dorsey v. Yoder
Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972);
Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640-41, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890, 895 (1973); Roach v. Konohen, 99 Adv. Ore. 1092, -, 525 P.2d 125, 127-
28 (1974); Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN.
L. Rsv. 325, 326 n.5 (1971); Note, Products Liability: Methods of Pleading
and Proof for the Plaintiff, supra note 78, at 108; 50 N.C.L. REv. 417, 424
(1972). But see Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 477, 467 P.2d
229, 237, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (1970); Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399,
420, 426 P.2d 525, 539, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 139 (1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring);
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15-16, 403 P.2d 145, 149-50, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 21-22 (1965); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 261,
391 P.2d 168, 170-71, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898-99 (1964); Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944) (Traynor, 3.,
concurring); cases cited notes 83 & 84 infra; Note, Products Liability and
Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra note 20.
82. Wade, supra note 30, at 17; Wade, supra note 49, at 837-38. Wade's
criteria are approved in a strict products liability setting in Roach v. Kono-
hen, 99 Adv. Ore. 1092, -, 525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (1974).
83. See, e.g., Phipps v. Air King Mfg., 263 Ore. 141, 501 P.2d 790 (1972);
Rivara v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill. App. 3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828
(1971).
84. See, e.g., Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1973);
Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970).
85. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 126, 528 P.2d at 1156,
117 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Clark, J., dissenting).
86. One commentator argues that limiting instructions provide "dubious
226
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such an issue of evidence admissible for one purpose, but inadmis-
sible for another, the familiar limited admissibility doctrine is in-
voked. The trial judge should exercise his discretion and balance
the need for the evidence and its probative value against the preju-
dice to the opposing party and the confusion apt to be caused the
jury.8 7  Justice Clark advocated just such a balancing approach
in his dissenting opinion in Ault. 8 If the trial judge determines
a limiting instruction is an insufficient safeguard, he should exclude
the evidence entirely8
9
The second consideration which warrants the extension of the ex-
clusionary rule to strict products liability is but another component
of the balancing test just discussed. There is in fact no compelling
need for evidence of subsequent remedial conduct in products
protection in light of the prejudicial nature of evidence of repairs." 18
HASTINGs L.J. 677, 679 (1967); see also Barone v. 111 E. 39th St. Corp., 38
App. Div. 2d 797, 328 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1972) (limiting instruction an insuffi-
cient safeguard in subsequent repair case).
In Ault, the defendant failed to request any limiting instruction at all.
(Petition for Rehearing in the Supreme Court for Plaintiff and Respondent
at 19-20).
87. CAL. EviD. CODE § 352 (West 1968); FED. R. EvD. 43; McCoRMcK,
supra note 8, at 668-69; 1 WIGmoRE, supra note 8, at 299; WIzN=, supra
note 11, at 343-44. See also Faber v. Roelofs, 298 Minn. 16, 22, 212 N.W.2d
856, 860 (1973) and Kennard v. Mountain View Dev. Co., 69 Wash. 2d 492,
494, 419 P.2d 154, 155 (1966) (both cases giving trial judge discretion to
utilize such a balancing approach when confronted with proposed subse-
quent repair evidence).
88. 13 Cal. 3d at 126-27, 528 P.2d at 1156-57, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21.
89. The discretion of the trial judge to exclude such evidence in Cali-
fornia is a product of both case law and statute. Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal.
252, 258-59, 193 P. 251, 254 (1920); CAL. Evm. CODE § 352 (West 1968).
Jury trials are the rule in products liability cases. For example, in the
several California cases delineated in notes 98-109 supra, only Kriegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) and Seely
v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) were
apparently tried to the bench. Bench trials represent a greater danger of
misuse of subsequent repair evidence where a balancing approach to admis-
sibility is utilized. The trial judge will be advised of any subsequent re-
medial conduct taken by a defendant in the course of hearing the pro-
ponent's offer of proof. Even if the judge rules the evidence logically or
legally irrelevant, it is foolish to assume he can readily dismiss it from his
mind. In a jury trial, of course, the triers of fact do not hear the offer
of proof and will not be advised of the evidence of subsequent change if
it is found to be inadmissible.
cases. Plaintiff can resort to several other methods of proof to es-
tablish the presence of a defect and causation. First, plaintiff can
evidence the nature of the product itself.90  This might involve
bringing the product itself into court, calling witnesses at the scene
of the accident, and the use of expert testimony to elucidate a latent
defect in manufacture or design. Second, plaintiff can evidence the
pattern or happening of the accident, which goes to show that a
defect could have been at play in producing the accident.0 1 Third,
the life history of the product which may well include previous
operational difficulties can be disclosed in demonstrating defective-
ness and causation.92 Fourth, plaintiff can point to similar prod-
ucts and uses.93 In Ault, for example, Justice Clark points out that
feasibility of alternative design, an element of defectiveness, could
have been proven by offering evidence that other manufacturers
produced vehicles with an iron gear box prior to the accident.9 -1
Fifth, plaintiff can resort to the elimination of alternative causes
of the accident.95 Finally, it is possible to establish the existence
of a product defect by purely circumstantial evidence without re-
sort to subsequent remedial conduct.96 These alternative methods
90. Rheingold, supra note 81, at 327; Note, Products Liability: Methods
of Pleading and Proof for the Plaintiff, supra note 78, at 122.
91. Rheingold, supra note 81, at 330, 337; Note, Products Liability: Meth-
ods of Pleading and Proof for the Plaintiff, supra note 78, at 123; 50 N.C.
L. REv. 417, 422 (1972).
92. Rheingold, supra note 81, at 331; Note, Products Liability: Methods
of Pleading and Proof for the Plaintiff, supra note 78, at 123; 50 N.C. L.
REV. 417, 421 (1972).
93. Rheingold, supra note 81, at 332; Note, Products Liability: Methods
of Pleading and Proof for the Plaintiff, supra note 78, at 123.
94. 13 Cal. 3d at 127 n.3, 528 P.2d at 1157 n.3, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 821 n.3.
It is noted here that in both the first Ault majority opinion and in Justice
Clark's dissenting opinion in the later decision, it is said that the issue on
which the evidence of subsequent change was offered was that of feasibility
of malleable iron in the production of the gear boxes. 10 Cal. 3d at -
(opinion omitted), 515 P.2d at 315, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 372; 13 Cal. 3d at 127,
528 P.2d at 1157, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (Clark, J., dissenting). In fact, how-
ever, the key issue in the case on which the evidence was offered was that
of causation, i.e., whether the failure of the gear box was due to its alum-
inum design or the impact as the vehicle fell down the canyon. 13 Cal.
3d at 117, 528 P.2d at 1149, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 813; Petition for Rehearing
in the Supreme Court for Plaintiff and Respondent at 15-16. Feasibility
and impeachment of an adverse witness were also proposed as theories of
admissibility. Petition for Rehearing at 24.
In a defective design case such as Ault, causation and defectiveness ap-
pear to merge into a single issue, such that the trier of fact may view a
subsequent change not only as evidence of causation but also as an implied
admission of an antecedent defect. Either use of the evidence may lead
to deterrence of manufacturers from taking remedial measures to correct an
allegedly defective product.
95. Rheingold, supra note 81, at 335; 50 N.C. L. REV. 417, 422 (1972).
96. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 260, 391 P.2d 168, 170,
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of proof coupled with the danger of misuse of subsequent repair
evidence by juries9 7 makes a solid case for extending the exclusion-
ary rule to strict products liability. Greater credence to these con-
siderations by the Ault majority might well have resulted in such
a holding.
CONCLUSION
California is a leading proponent of strict products liability. It
was the California Supreme Court which first espoused strict lia-
bility in tort of product manufacturers."" Since then the theory
has been made applicable to retailers,99 bailors and lessors,10
wholesalers and distributors,'' licensors, 0 2 manufacturers of com-
ponents parts, 0 3 and sellers of mass-produced homes. 04 Its
protection has been extended to members of the buyer's family, 0 5
the buyer's employee,10 6 and mere bystanders.10 7 The only in-
stance found where there has been curtailment is the refusal of
37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898 (1964); Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal.
App. 2d 793, 799, 50 Cal. Rptr. 143, 146 (1966). A products liability case
based entirely on circumstantial evidence and without resort to subsequent
remedial conduct is Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451
P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969), discussed in Rheingold, supra note 81,
at 340-41 & n.63.
97. See notes 70-86 supra and accompanying text.
98. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); see note 49 supra.
99. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 171-
72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 900 (1964).
100. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 248, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 178, 182 (1970); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal.
App. 2d 446, 452, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 (1969).
101. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 252-53, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306, 321 (1968); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d
44, 52, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 558 (1965).
102. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 325-26, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423
(1970).
103. Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987, 996-97, 41 Cal. Rptr.
514, 520-21 (1964).
104. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 259 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 749, 752 (1969).
105. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964).
106. Casetta v. United States Rubber Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 792, 800-01,
67 Cal. Rptr. 645, 650 (1968).
107. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84,
88, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656 (1969).
recovery in strict liability for solely economic losses, where there
is involved failure of a product to meet performance expectations
but no physical injury caused by the product. 08 Recent decisions
have made it easier for a plaintiff to make a case in strict products
liability.109 In this sense, Ault v. International Harvester Co.
represents a continuation of an expansive trend in giving the plain-
tiff greater inroads to establishing liability by facilitating proof.
However, the decision is subject to legitimate criticism. It was
reached at the expense of tortured construction of the "culpable
conduct" language of California Evidence Code section 1151. In
addition, the Ault majority ignored strong policy reasons for ex-
tending the exclusionary rule to strict products liability. It is in-
evitable that juries will misuse subsequent repair evidence in prod-
ucts cases as admissions of negligence, or at least become quite con-
fused by limiting instructions. Because the majority rejected a
case-by-case balancing approach and held outright that subsequent
remedial conduct evidence is admissible in strict products liability
cases, trial court judges are left without discretion to exclude such
evidence. Finally, the aftermath of the new rule of outright admis-
sibility may well be frustrated by mass-producers hesitant to take
corrective measures. In this sense, Ault v. International Harvester
Co. represents a step backward in the protection of consumers from
unsafe products.
J. WES=EY MMMTT
108. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18-19, 403 P.2d 145, 150-51,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23-24 (1965).
109. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134-35, 501 P.2d 1153,
1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 443 (1972) provided that a plaintiff need not estab-
lish that the product defect which caused his injury made the product un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal.
3d 136, 139, 501 P.2d 1163, 1165, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 445 (1972) provided that
a plaintiff need not establish that he was not aware of the defect at the
time of the accident.
